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When a risky prospect is valued more than its best possible 
outcome 





  In this paper, we document a violation of normative and descriptive models of 
decision making under risk.  In contrast to uncertainty effects found by Gneezy, List 
and Wu (2006), some subjects in our experiments valued certain lotteries more than 
the best possible outcome. We show that the likelihood of observing this effect is 
positively related to the probability of winning the lottery and negatively related to the 
value of the maximum outcome. We also demonstrate that this effect can be partially 
attributed  to  subjects’  competitiveness  and  level  of  comprehension  of  the  lottery 
mechanism; the competitiveness effects far outweighing comprehension effects. 
JEL codes: D81, D44 




Decision  making  often  involves  choices  between  risky  properties.  Prospect 
theory and expected utility theory both posit that individuals balance outcomes and 
their  (potentially  weighted)  probability  of  occurrence,  which  then  means  that  the 
value  or  certainty  equivalent  of  a  binary  lottery  will  lie  somewhere  between  the 
lowest and the highest outcomes. However, Gneezy, List and Wu (2006) document 
cases where individuals value a risky prospect less than its worst possible realization. 
They call this phenomenon  the uncertainty effect and demonstrate  its existence  in 
various  laboratory  experiments  (including  real  and  hypothetical  pricing  tasks  and 
inter-temporal choice tasks) as well as in a field experiment (a sportscard market). 
This  uncertainty  effect,  however,  disappears  in  within-subject  designs  and  is  only 
observed in lotteries that do not involve cash. 
In this note, we document cases of the polar opposite of the uncertainty effect, 
where individuals value the outcome of a risky prospect more than its best possible 
realization. We demonstrate cases where subjects are willing to pay as much as three 
times the value of the best possible realization of a lottery in a second price auction. 
We term this effect the overbidding effect.  
It is tempting to attribute the result to the particulars of the value elicitation 
mechanism.    For  example,  in  Kagel  and  Levin’s  (1993)  non-risky  induced  value 
experiments, subjects tended to slightly overbid in a second price auction. Kagel and 
Levin (1993) attributed this overbidding to either the dominant bidding strategy not 
being transparent to subjects or to weak learning feedback mechanisms in the second 
price  sealed  bid  auction.    Although  this  result  is  often  taken  as  a  stylized  fact 
associated  with  second  price  auctions,  Lusk  and  Shogren  (2007)  document  that 
several more recent induced value studies that focus on all bidders’ values (not just 
the  market  price)  tend  to  find  behaviour  more  in-line  with  theoretical  predicted 
bidding  behaviour  in the  second price auction.   Even  if we  accept the Kagel and 
Levin’s (1993) result of over-bidding  in the second price auction,  it is difficult to 
conclude  that this  is  the  primary  cause  of  the  behaviour  observed  here.  Although 
subjects  in  our  experiments  “overbid,”  we  would  expect  people’s  bids  to  lie 
somewhere close to the expected payoff,  not close to the maximum payoff of the 
lottery.      3 
Hence,  in  addition  to  documenting  the  overbidding  effect,  we  sought  to 
identify the causes of the effect. Two non-exclusive possible causes of the observed 
effect are confusion or comprehension (i.e. subjects did not  understand the payoff 
mechanism of a lottery) and/or utility from winning and being the “top dog” of the 
experiment (i.e. to walk out of the experiment as the “top dog” among their peers) 
(Shogren et al. 2001). Regarding the first issue, Plott and Zeiler (2005) show that the 
often-reported WTP-WTA disparity is likely a result of subject confusion with the 
elicitation mechanism – suggesting the WTP-WTA divergence is not an underlying 
feature of preference per se but rather a result of misunderstanding with the bidding 
mechanism.          
  Our results suggest that the overbidding effect can, in part, be attributed to 
comprehension of how lotteries work, but that training with the second price auction 
does  not  eliminate  the  overbidding  effect.  While  we  find  that  comprehension 
negatively  influences  the  probability  of  overbidding,  competitiveness  positively 
affects this probability. Our results also suggest that the overbidding effect tends to 
attenuate when the maximum payoff of the lottery increases and accentuates when 
winning becomes more likely.  
This paper is structured as follows: The next section discusses the design of 
our auction experiments followed by the econometric analysis and results. The last 
section contains the conclusions. 
 
Experimental design 
A  conventional  lab  experiment  was  conducted  using  the  z-Tree  software 
(Fischbacher 2007). Subjects consisted of undergraduate students of the Agricultural 
University of Athens in Greece. During the recruitment, the nature of the experiment 
and the expected earnings were not mentioned.  
We  used  a  2
nd  price  Vickrey  auction  to  determine  the  selling  price  of  the 
lotteries.  A  2x2  design  was  adopted  varying  the  extent  of  training  (minimal  vs. 
extensive training) and posting of market clearing prices (posting vs. no posting of the 
2
nd highest price). Each subject participated in only one treatment. The size of the 
groups varied from 17 to 18 subjects per treatment. Each treatment lasted no more 
than  an  hour.  In  total,  71  subjects  participated  in  our  experiments,  which  were 
conducted in March 2009. 
Each  session  included  four  phases:  the training  phase, the  choice  task, the 
lottery auction phase and the post-experimental phase. Data from the choice task are 
analyzed elsewhere. Subjects were given prior instructions on the overall layout of the 
session and were also reminded on the procedures at the beginning of each phase. 
 
The training phase 
We used a 2
nd price Vickrey auction, a commonly used elicitation method in 
experimental auction studies, to elicit subjects’ prices of lotteries. After arriving at the 
lab, subjects were randomly seated in  front of a computer. Subjects were  given a 
fifteen Euros (15€) participation fee at the end of the experiment. We emphasized that 
although they were not given the money at the beginning of the experiment, the 15€ 
was theirs to use as they please and that they should think that they have this money 
already. To control for possible monetary endowment effects, subjects were also told 
that a random amount of  money  between 0.5€ and 3€ was going to be randomly   4 
assigned to each one of them
1. Everyone then received this  random fee, which was 
added to their participation fee, as soon as the computerized phase  of the experiment 
began. We emphasized to the subjects that the endowment they  received was private 
information and that they should not communicate this information to other subjects 
in  the  lab.  All  transactions  were  completed  at  the  end  of  the  experiment.  No 
information about this additional endowment was given during recruitment. 
Subjects were then shown a short presentation about how the auctions work to 
familiarize them with the procedure. All instructions were in PowerPoint and were 
projected onto a screen in the  front of the lab. The instructions emphasized that the 
participants should not communicate with each other. Subjects were given a shor t 
introduction on how the 2
nd price Vickrey auction works, a short example on how bids 
are sorted in a descending order and on how the 2
nd highest bid and the winner are 
selected. In addition, a numerical example was given to indicate to respondents why it 
is in their best interest to bid exactly the amount the product is worth to them and to 
demonstrate the incentive compatibility of the auction.  Subjects were then asked to 
take  a  short  computerized  test regarding  the  procedure. The  correct  answers  were 
presented on their screen after everyone completed the test. The questions and the 
correct answers were read aloud and explained to subjects as well. 
The set of instructions included a short section on what the subjects will see on 
their  computer  screen  to  familiarize  them  with  the  computerized  part  of  the 
experiment. Instructions were also given on how subjects should submit their bids in 
the  appropriate  fields  of  their  screen.  We  did  not  find  it  necessary  to  include  a 
computer-training phase since all the subjects were students and already had computer 
experience. 
The first part of the training included five hypothetical multi-product
2 auction 
rounds. We emphasized to the subjects that these rounds were intended to familiarize 
them with the auction procedure and although they would not have to pay any money 
to buy any product they should bid as if they were in a real auction and as if they 
really intended to buy the product. We also told them that one round and one product 
would be  randomly  chosen at the end   of these rounds as binding. A screen with 
subjects’ hypothetical payoffs was displayed after these rounds. 
In the second part of the training, we included five real multi-product
3 auction 
rounds. We emphasized to the subjects that these rounds were real a nd that if they 
chose to buy a product they would actually have to pay for it. Similar to the previous 
hypothetical rounds, one round and one product were  randomly chosen as binding at 
the end of these rounds. A screen with subjects’ payoffs was displayed after these 
rounds. 
Subjects who participated in the minimal training treatment were not exposed 
to the full training as described above. Subjects in the minimal training treatment were 
not provided with a numerical example on how a 2
nd price auction works, were not 
given  a  computerized  test  and  were  not  explicitly  informed  about  the  incentive 
compatibility of the auction.  They also participated only in the hypothetical rounds, 
not in the real ones. 
 
The choice phase 
                                                 
1 In every step that involved random drawings by the computer, we reassured subjects that the drawing 
was fair and that extra care was taken by the programmer to make sure that this is the case. 
2 The products were a packet of gums, a bag of cookies and a bag of potato chips. 
3 The products we used were a Tobleron chocolate, a pack of Soft Kings cookies and Kraft’s Lacta 
chocolate.   5 
After  the  training  phase,  the  experiment  on  choice  between  lotteries  was 
performed. We asked subjects to indicate their preference for each of three pairs of 
lotteries with the understanding that each pair has an equal chance of being randomly 
selected as binding and  that their decision or choice  in each pair will  be applied. 
Subjects were also informed that at the end of the choice phase and the lottery auction 
phase, a randomly generated number by the computer would determine which of the 
two phases would be selected as binding. Subjects during the training phase were 
shown numerical examples on what exactly would happen depending on the payoff of 
the lottery under winning and losing scenarios. 
The  three  pairs  of  lotteries  with  their  corresponding  chances  and  expected 
payoffs are exhibited in Table 1. To avoid any order effect, bet pairs and lotteries in 
each pair were randomly shown in each subject’s screen and thus were presented to 
each subject in different order. 
Bet pairs 1 and 3 were adopted from Cox and Grether (1996)
4. Bet pair 2 was 
added as a medium expected payoff category to the high and low expected payoff  
lotteries of Cox and Grether. Notice that for bet pair 1, the bad outcome for the $-bet 
is worse than that for the P-bet
5.  The opposite exists for bet pair 3, while for bet pair 
2, the bad outcomes are equal. 
 
Table 1. Lotteries used in the experiment 










A  P-bet 
1 
90%  4  10%  1  3.50 
B  $-bet  28%  16  72%  1.5  3.40 
C  P-bet 
2 
80%  3  20%  1  2.20 
D  $-bet  24%  12  76%  1  2.12 
E  P-bet 
3 
75%  2  25%  1  1.25 
F  $-bet  18%  9  82%  0.5  1.21 
 
The lottery auction phase 
In the lottery auction phase, we presented subjects with the same six lotteries 
and asked subjects to indicate how much, if any, they are willing to pay to buy each of 
the lotteries. The appearance of the lotteries was ordered randomly for each subject. 
Subjects repeated the bidding task for ten consecutive rounds and were informed that 
if the lottery auction phase was chosen as binding, only one lottery and one round 
would  then  be  randomly  chosen  as  binding.  In  the  treatment  with  posted  market 
clearing prices, subjects were able to observe the 2
nd highest price and winner’s ID 
(which could not identify the winner since these were anonymously assigned by the 
computer), while in the no posted market clearing prices treatment, subjects were only 
observing the winner’s ID. 
 
The post-experimental phase 
After the experiment, we collected standard socio-demographic  information 
about  subjects’  age,  household  size  and  economic  position  of  their  household 
                                                 
4 We had to modify the chances into a percentage form since in the original paper these were given in a 
different format. The expected payoffs are very close to the ones reported in the original paper. 
5 The P-bet lottery involves a bet with a high probability of winning a modest amount and a low 
probability of losing an even more modest amount and the $-bet involves a bet with a modest 
probability of winning a large amount and a high probability of winning a modest amount.   6 
(evaluated at a 5-likert scale). We  further contacted subjects for a short telephone 
interview. In this interview, subjects were asked two sets of questions. The first set 
was composed of four questions seeking to determine subject’s comprehension of a 
lottery’s payoff. The purpose was to investigate if subjects understood well what the 
payoff of a lottery meant and to assess if they were bidding out of confusion in the 
auction phase. We asked subjects to imagine themselves in a situation where they are 
given a lottery with 78% probability of winning 6€ and 22% probability of losing 2€. 
We then asked subjects to indicate the maximum payoff and the maximum loss of this 
lottery. We also asked subjects their overall profit (loss) if they bought this lottery for 
4€ and then won (lost) the lottery. These questions were given in random order to 
each subject. We then summed up the correct answers to derive a “comprehension 
score” for each individual. 
The  second  set  of  questions  was  aimed  at  determining  subjects’ 
competitiveness trait. We adopted the scale developed by Brown, Cron and Slocum 
(1998). We asked subjects to indicate if they agree or disagree with four statements 
(given in random order) on a 7 Likert-scale ranging from totally disagree to totally 
agree.  A  competitiveness  score  was  created  by  summing  people’s  answers  to  the 
following  four statements: (a) I enjoy working  in situations  involving competition 
with others; (b) It is important to me to perform better than others on a task; (c) I feel 
that winning is important in both work and games; and (d) I try harder when I am in 
competition with other people.  
 
Experimental results 
Out of the six lotteries auctioned, we observed that subjects bid more than the 
best (but uncertain) outcomes for lotteries A, C, E and F (with maximum payoffs of 
4€, 3€, 2€ and 9€ respectively, see table 1)
6. We did not observe similar behavior , 
however, for lotteries B and D (with maximum payoffs of 16€ and 12€ respectively, 
see table 1). Table 2 shows the mean, median and maximum bid observed by round 
for the six lotteries. It also exhibits the percentage of subjects overbidding by round 
and lottery. As evident in the table, the mean bid is increasing through the rounds, 
mainly  due  to  a  few  subjects  bidding  high  for  the  lotteries.  The  median  bid  is 
relatively constant across rounds. 
 
Table 2. Mean, median and maximum bids by rounds 
    Rounds 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Lottery A 
Mean  1.54  1.96  2.17  2.29  2.25  2.35  2.31  2.29  2.42  2.39 
Median  1.00  1.70  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00 
Maximum 
bid  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.40  5.80  6.00  6.80  7.00 
  % of 
overbidders  4.23  1.41  2.82  9.86  15.5  14.08  12.68  14.08  15.49  14.08 
Lottery B 
Mean  1.28  1.96  2.26  2.55  2.83  2.94  3.29  3.19  3.57  3.36 
Median  0.80  1.50  1.50  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.80  2.00  3.00  2.00 
Maximum 
bid  10.00  8.00  8.99  8.99  10.00  10.00  11.00  11.00  15.99  15.50 
  % of  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
                                                 
6 Although the number of cases for lottery F was very small (2 cases).   7 
overbidders 
Lottery C 
Mean  1.02  1.29  1.46  1.50  1.55  1.65  1.68  1.67  1.70  1.79 
Median  1.00  1.00  1.20  1.10  1.10  1.20  1.50  1.49  1.50  1.50 
Maximum 
bid  3.00  3.50  4.00  4.00  5.00  6.00  6.80  5.00  5.69  6.10 
  % of 
overbidders  0  2.82  2.82  4.23  9.86  12.68  11.27  12.67  14.08  12.68 
Lottery D 
Mean  1.21  1.72  1.88  2.43  2.62  2.82  2.85  3.06  3.16  2.99 
Median  1.00  1.50  1.30  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00 
Maximum 
bid  10.00  7.00  7.50  8.00  9.00  9.00  9.00  10.00  11.99  11.90 
  % of 
overbidders  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Lottery E 
Mean  0.61  0.91  0.99  0.99  1.05  1.05  1.09  1.14  1.25  1.26 
Median  0.50  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Maximum 
bid  2.00  2.56  2.50  2.98  5.00  3.55  4.39  4.76  5.99  6.23 
  % of 
overbidders  0  2.82  5.63  7.04  11.27  7.04  5.63  9.86  11.27  11.27 
Lottery F 
Mean  0.97  1.42  1.76  1.94  2.18  2.47  2.52  2.59  2.76  2.57 
Median  0.50  1.00  1.60  1.50  1.90  2.00  1.50  1.90  2.00  1.50 
Maximum 
bid  8.00  6.00  7.00  7.00  7.00  7.30  7.10  10.00  9.00  10.00 
 
% of 
overbidders  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.41  0  1.41 
 
Overbidding  behavior  was  simultaneously  observed  for  multiple  lotteries. 
Table 3 shows the number of overbidders for 1, 2 and 3 lotteries in any given round. 
Overbidding  tended  to  begin  for  one  lottery  in  the  early  rounds  but  overbidding 
became more prevalent for other lotteries as the number of rounds increased. 
 
Table 3. Number of overbidders by rounds 
  Rounds 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Overbid for 1 lottery  3  5  5  7  8  3  3  6  6  3 
Overbid for 2 lotteries  0  0  0  1  3  3  3  3  4  2 
Overbid for 3 lotteries  0  0  1  2  4  5  4  5  5  7 
Total  3  5  6  10  15  11  10  14  15  12 
 
Table 4 shows the number of distinct overbidders per round (this is the same 
as  the  row  total  in  Table  3)  and  the  total  number  of  overbids  in  each  round 
(aggregated over all lotteries). Note that when these figures deviate from each other, it 
is an indication that the extra overbids come from the same subjects that overbid on 
multiple lotteries. As shown in this table, subjects also tend to overbid for more than 
one lottery as the rounds progress. This can be seen in the third row of Table 4, which 
shows the ratio of total overbids over distinct overbidders (TMO/DMO). In the first   8 
two rounds, subjects-overbid for just one lottery out of six (ratio equals 1) while in the 
10




Table 4. Number of overbidders and overbids by rounds 
  Rounds 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Distinct overbidders 
(DMO)  3  5  6  10  15  11  10  14  15  12 
Total overbids (TMO)  3  5  8  15  26  24  21  27  29  28 
Ratio TMO/DMO  1.00  1.00  1.33  1.50  1.73  2.18  2.10  1.93  1.93  2.33 
 
Table  5  shows  the  number  of  new  overbidders  (based  on  their  id’s  and 
aggregated over lotteries) that are added in every round. Results indicate that up to 
round 5, new subjects tend to imitate the overbidding behavior of subjects from earlier 
rounds. Hence, it appears that five rounds in our experiments are sufficient for the 
overbidding effect to arise and stabilize. In all, the documented overbidding behavior 
is caused by roughly one third (25 subjects) of the participants in our experiments. 
 
Table 5. Number of new overbidders by rounds 
  Rounds  Total 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10   
Number of new 
overbidders  3  4  3  5  8  0  0  1  1  0  25 
 
 
   To explore why subjects tend to bid higher than the best possible outcome of 
the lotteries, we created dummy variables taking the value of one when a subject bid 
more than the best outcome of a lottery. We then estimated  random effects probit 
models  that  included  as  covariates  the  dummies  for  the  treatments,  a  variable 
indicating  the  round,  gender,  age,  perceived  economic  position  of  the  household, 
household  size,  total  fee  (to  control  for  money  endowment  effects),  a  variable 
indicating  comprehension  of  the  payoff  mechanism  of  a  lottery,  and  a  variable 
indicating  competitiveness  traits  of  the  subject.  Some  descriptive  statistics  of  the 
associated variables are exhibited in Table 6
7. 
 
Table 6. Variables and variable description 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev. 
WinLovLotA  Dummy, 1=subject bid over the best outcome 
for lottery A, 0=otherwise  0.11  0.31 
WinLovLotC  Dummy, 1=subject bid over the best outcome 
for lottery C, 0=otherwise  0.08  0.26 
WinLovLotE  Dummy, 1=subject bid over the best outcome  0.09  0.28 
                                                 
7 Since in the telephone interviews we were unable to establish contact with 6 subjects, Table 6 and 
subsequent tables refer to a sample size of 65 subjects out of the 71 that participated in the 
experimental auctions.   9 
for lottery E, 0=otherwise 
TreatPrice 
Dummy, 1=subject participated in the posted 
market clearing price treatment, 0= subject 
participated in the no-posted market clearing 
price treatment 
0.51  0.50 
TreatTrain 
Dummy, 1=subject participated in the extensive 
training treatment, 0= subject participated in the 
minimal training treatment 
0.51  0.50 
Gender  Dummy, 1=male, 0=female  0.38  0.49 
TotFee  Total endowment fee for participation  16.76  0.81 
EconPosition1*  Dummy, 1=economic position of the household 
is good or very good, 0=otherwise  0.34  0.47 
EconPosition2  Dummy, 1=economic position of the household 
is above average, 0=otherwise  0.26  0.44 
EconPosition3  Dummy, 1=economic position of the household 
is average or worse, 0=otherwise  0.40  0.49 
Age  Subject’s age  20.74  1.54 
Hsize  Household size  4.45  1.11 
Comprehension  Score of comprehension of lottery’s payoff 
mechanism  2.75  1.07 
Competitiveness  Subject’s competitiveness traits  21.05  4.25 
* Removed from estimation 
   
  Table  7  exhibits  the  semi-elasticities  of  the  form  of  d ln Prob /d YX  
which indicate the percentage change in the probability of the dependent variable Y 
resulting from a unit change in X. We can see from Table 7
8 that both comprehension 
and competitiveness have a statistically significant effect on the probability of bidding 
more than the best outcome of the lottery.  Specifically, competitiveness positively 
affects the probability of being a n overbidder but the effect attenuates, in terms of 
statistical significance, as the maximum possible payoff of the lottery increases ( i.e., 
moving from lottery A to C and then to E). On the other hand, comprehension of the 
lottery’s payoff negatively affects the probability of being an overbidder but the effect 
is  statistically  significant  for  only  one  lottery  (lottery  C).  One  could  therefore 
conclude that the observed behavior in the lab of bidding more than the best outcome 
of  a  lottery  can  be  explained  more  by  competitiveness  traits  and  less  by 
comprehension of the payoff mechanism of the lotteries. 
 
Table 7. Estimated semi-elasticities from random effects probit models and pooled 
probit model (overbidders) 



















TreatPrice  1.575  12.978*  5.605  2.323** 
                                                 
8 We could not estimate a random effects probit model for lottery F due to small variability in the 
dependent variable.   10 


















































































Probability of win  -  -  -  8.049** 
(1.528) 
Max payoff  -  -  -  -0.246** 
(0.099) 
Min payoff  -  -  -  0.662 
(2.221) 
*(**) Statistically significant at the 10%(5%) level. 
 
  Our results further indicate that the overbidding effect is more likely to occur 
as the rounds evolve. For lottery C, posting the market clearing price between rounds 
did have an effect on the probability of being an overbidder. It is possible that posting 
of price information for the lottery exacerbated competitiveness. On the other hand, 
training did not have a statistically significant effect. As for the demographics, results 
suggest  that  males  and  younger  subjects  are  more  likely  to  be  classified  as 
overbidders than females and older subjects, respectively. 
  To further explore the issue of why subjects exhibited overbidding behavior 
only in specific lotteries, we estimated pooled probit regressions (last column in Table 
7) where we used lottery characteristics (i.e., the probability of winning the lottery, 
the  maximum  payoff  of  the  lottery  and  the  minimum  payoff  of  the  lottery)  as 
independent variables. Table 7 shows that the overbidding effect attenuates when we 
move  to  lotteries  with  high  maximum  payoffs,  which  explains  why  we  did  not 
observe such an effect for lotteries B and D. In addition, the probability of winning is 
positively  associated  with  the  probability  of  overbidding  in  any  given  lottery.  It 
appears  that  moving  from  uncertain  to  certain  outcomes  (i.e.,  increasing  the 
probability of winning) reduces the costs of misbehaving with respect to optimality. 
To complement our analysis and further investigate behavior under risk, we 
categorized the subjects as risk lovers (risk averters) if they bid more (less) than the 
expected payoff of a lottery. We then estimated random effects probit models. The 
results are presented in Tables 8 and 9, respectively. The last column in Tables 8 and 






Table 8. Estimated semi-elasticities from random effects probit models and pooled 
probit model (risk lovers) 























































































































































































win  -  -  -  -  -  -  -2.526** 
(0.205) 
Max payoff  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.048** 
(0.011) 
Min payoff  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.049 
0.107 
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Table 9. Estimated semi-elasticities from random effects probit models and pooled 
probit model (risk averters) 























































































































































































win  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.721** 
(0.076) 
Max payoff  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.019** 
(0.004) 




For  risk  lovers,  comprehension  and  competition  do  not  significantly  affect 
their risk taking behavior. On the other hand, older and male individuals are more 
likely to engage in risk taking behavior. Risk taking behavior is also more likely to 
evolve across rounds and in some lotteries, extensive training induced subjects to bid 
higher than the expected payoff of the lottery. It is worth noting that the pooled probit 
regression  shows  that  when  the  winning  outcome  becomes  more  likely,  the 
probability of behaving as a risk lover decreases. It is possible that when risk is taken 
out of a risky prospect, then the lottery looses its appeal for risk lovers. In addition, 
similar to overbidders, higher winning outcomes decrease the probability of behaving 
as a risk lover.  
Interestingly, results for risk averse subjects follow an opposite trend. Male 
individuals and those exposed to extensive training are less likely to be risk averse. 
The  effect  is  also  less  likely  to  evolve  across  rounds.  Competition  traits  only 
marginally affect the probability of being a risk averter for one of the lotteries. The   13 
signs of the probability of win and maximum outcome variables in the pooled probit 




In  this  paper,  we  document  violations  in  individuals’  valuation  of  risky 
prospects.  Subjects  in  our  experiments  valued  some  lotteries  more  than  the  best 
possible outcome of the lotteries (i.e., overbidder’s effect). In some cases this can be 
as much as three times the maximum payoff of the lottery.  Our results generally 
suggest that as the value of a risky prospect increases the likelihood of observing an 
overbidder’s effect decreases.   However, we do not observe an overbidder’s effect in 
lotteries with higher maximum payoffs (i.e., lotteries with maximum payoffs more 
than 9€).  Our results also suggest that the probability of observing an overbidder’s 
effect  is  negatively  related  to  the  value  of  the  maximum  winning  outcome  and 
positively related to the likelihood of winning.  
  In this paper, we also showed that overbidder’s effect can be partly attributed 
to  individuals’  competitiveness  traits  and,  to  some  extent,  comprehension  of  the 
lottery’s  payoff  mechanism.  Specifically,  we  find  that  competitiveness  positively 
influences  the  probability  of  being  an  overbidder  while  comprehension  negatively 
affects this probability. That competitiveness influences bids tends to suggest that the 
overbidding effect may be an artefact associated with eliciting values using auction-
type rather than a fundamental feature of people’s preference. However, we cannot 
rule  out  this  latter  case  as  it  appears  that  characteristics  of  the  lottery  (not  just 
characteristics of the individual) also influence the extent of over-bidding. Our results 
also suggest the possibility that confusion about how lotteries work (rather than with 
the  elicitation  mechanism)  may  be  a  reason  for  anomalous  behaviour  frequently 
observed in decision making under risk. 
  Our  findings  imply  that  for  experiments  that  involve  risky  prospects,  we 
should not only try to interpret the results in light of the behavioral theories that have 
been  advanced  regarding  how  people  value  risky  prospects,  but  rather  begin  to 
develop theories of how people even understand lotteries and how the environments 
created  by  the  elicitation  mechanisms  themselves  (rather  than  “true”  underlying 
references) may be responsible for “irrational” behavior.   
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